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THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT TO THE
SEGREGATION OF HIV-POSITIVE INMATES
Ayesha Khan*

Abstract Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome has posed a formidable challenge to
correctional administrators because of the perception that prisons and jails hold high concentrations of individuals at risk of developing the disease. Housing decisions are particulaly difficult. Administrators often segregate inmates who have AIDS, ARC or
asymptomatic HIV infection from the general prison population by housing them in a
separate unit. This Article analyzes whether such a practice violates section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, which forbids programs which receive federal financial assistance from
discriminating against "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons. The analysis focuses
on three issues: the epidemiology of HIV in correctional facilities; whether Iv-positive
inmates are "handicapped" under the Act; and whether HIV-positive inmates are "otherwise qualified" to be integrated into the general prison population.

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)1 is a major policy
concern for public health officials everywhere. It poses a formidable
challenge to correctional administrators because of the perception that
prisons and jails hold high concentrations of individuals at risk of
developing AIDS as a result of prior intravenous drug use, and
because correctional inmates frequently engage in behavior likely to
* National Women's Law and Public Policy Fellow, working with the Intrafamily Offense
Unit of the Juvenile Section of the Criminal Division of the District of Columbia's Corporation
Council. B.A., 1984, University of Michigan; J.D., 1989, Boalt Hall School of Law, University
of California at Berkeley. I wish to thank Martin Eskenazi for his encouragement and editorial
suggestions.
1. AIDS is a communicable disease, caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),
that undermines the human body's ability to combat infections and malignancies. W. MASTERS,
V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, CRISIS: HETEROSEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AGE OF AIDS 17
(1988). AIDS is the end-stage of HIV infection. In earlier stages of infection, many people have
no visible symptoms, while others experience various types of mild illness or more serious
problems that do not fit the diagnosis of a full-blown case of AIDS. Id. Why some people
remain asymptomatic for long periods of time while others progress rapidly into symptomatic
infection is unclear. Id at 35-36. Once a person develops symptoms, he or she crosses into a
category called AIDS-related complex (ARC). Id at 39. Again, some people with ARC develop
AIDS within months, while others have a more stable condition. Id at 40. However, while
estimates vary, it is likely that a majority of HIV-infected persons will ultimately develop AIDS
and die. Id
The great majority of cases in the United States have been among homosexual men and
intravenous drug users. Other methods of transmission include heterosexual activity and
transfusion of blood products. Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125-35 (1987).
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spread the disease, particularly homosexual activity and intravenous
drug use.2
Deciding where to house inmates who have AIDS, ARC, or asymptomatic HIV infection is one of the most critical and difficult decisions
for prison administrators. Medical considerations and correctional
management considerations both figure prominently in such decisions.
One of the available options is to segregate infected inmates from the
general prison population by housing them in a separate unit. As of
October 1, 1988, 39% of state and federal correctional systems segregated inmates with AIDS; 16% segregated inmates with ARC; and
12% segregated those with asymptomatic HIV infection. 3 Forty-six
percent of city and county jail systems nationwide segregated those
with AIDS; 21% segregated those with ARC; and 11% segregated
those with asymptomatic HIV infection. 4
Inmates have challenged segregative policies on various constitutional grounds. They have argued that segregation, even when "separate but equal," violates equal protection;5 that conditions in
segregation are inferior to those in the general prison, thereby violating equal protection; 6 that due process is violated by segregation; 7 that
conditions in segregation amount to a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment;' and that
denial of access to, among other things, religious services and group

2. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE ISSUES & PRACTICE, AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS iii (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES]; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE ISSUES & PRACTICE, 1988 UPDATE: AIDS IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES iii (1989) [hereinafter 1988 UPDATE].
3. 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at 34; see also Appendix A. For further breakdown and
discussion of these statistics, see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.

4. 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at 34; see also Appendix B.
5.

See, e.g., Lewis v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 88-1247 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1988)

(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Judd v. Packard, 669 F. Supp. 741 (D. Md. 1987).
6. See, e.g., Lewis, No. 88-1247 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
7. See, e.g., Lewis, No. 88-1247 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Powell v. Department of Corrections, 647 F. Supp. 968, 970 (N.D. Okla. 1986); Cordero, 607 F.
Supp. at 10.
8. See, e.g., Cordero, 607 F. Supp. at 11.
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activities while in segregation constitutes a first amendment violation.9
All challenges have failed. 10
Constitutional law is stacked against prisoners. Generally, prison
officials have broad discretionary authority to administer prisons,1 '

while prisoners retain only those rights that are not inconsistent with
either their status as prisoners or with the legitimate penological objectives of corrections systems.12 Specifically, under equal protection,
AIDS victims are not a suspect class and official discrimination
against the mentally retarded, and arguably against all handicapped

people, is not invidious discrimination and not subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Constitution." So long as there are legitimate government ends, and the means are rationally related to those ends, the
equal protection clause is not violated. 4 Under due process, prisoners
have no fundamental constitutional right to reside in the general prisoner population, and retain only a narrow range of protected liberty
interests.1 5 Indeed,
"administrative segregation,"... appears to be something of a catchall:
it may be used to protect the prisoner's safety, to protect other inmates
9. See, ag., Powell, 647 F. Supp. at 971; Cordero, 607 F. Supp. at 11. Inmates have raised
additional constitutional claims, for example, the claim that conditions in segregation deny
inmates their right of access to the courts. See ag., Powell, 647 F. Supp. at 971.
Interestingly, inmates have also argued that they have a right to be free from the risk of
contracting AIDS. Indeed, one might argue that the right of inmates with AIDS to be integrated
may be on a collision course with the right of uninfected inmates to be free from the risk of
contracting the disease. Courts find that a colorable claim is stated only if it is shown that there
exists "'a pervasive risk of harm to inmates of contracting the AIDS virus and if there is a failure
of prison officials to reasonably respond to that risk.'" Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536,
539-40 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Martin v. white, 742 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1984)); accord
Brown v. Delaware County Prison, No. 87-3596 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file). And in Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1572 (M.D. Ala. 1990), the
court found that allowing inmates with AIDS to be introduced in the general population "may"
violate the eighth amendment rights of the general prison population. Similarly, in In re La
Rocca, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 310 (Sup. Ct. 1983), the court found that the
segregation of prisoners with AIDS was a reasonable manner for the Department of Correctional
Services to fulfill its statutory obligation to provide a safe and humane place of confinement for
its inmates. No section 504 challenge was made by those subjected to the segregation; instead,
uninfected inmates were arguing that inmates with AIDS should be housed in a separate building
and that intensive screening of incoming inmates ought to be imposed. 467 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
10. Cf Roe v. Fauver, No. 88-1225 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist File)
(holding that the segregation of prisoners with AIDS under conditions inferior to those in the
general population raises genuine issues of material fact in a challenge based on, inter alia, equal
protection, due process, and the eighth amendment).
11. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566
(1974).
12. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
13. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985).
14. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
15. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1983).
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from a particular prisoner, to break up a potentially disruptive group of
inmates, or simply to await later classification or transfer.... [It] is the
sort of confinement that inmates should
reasonably anticipate receiving
16
at some point in their incarceration.
Under the eighth amendment, only "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners is proscribed."' 7 Finally, prisoners'
first amendment rights are analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies
and goals of the institution involved and the Supreme Court has
looked upon such claims disfavorably."8
An avenue for challenging the segregation of HIV-positive prisoners

that might prove promising is section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act'9
(the Act), which provides in pertinent part: "[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with handicaps2" . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance."
Thus, a violation of the Act requires that segregated HIV-positive
inmates be (1) otherwise qualified, (2) handicapped individuals, who
(3) suffer discrimination 2 1 under a program receiving federal financial
16. Id. at 468 (citation omitted).
17. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129-32 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). The only case that has decided the issue is Harris v. Thigpen, 727
F. Supp. 1564, 1582-83 (M.D. Ala. 1990), where the court found that HIV-positive inmates were
not "otherwise qualified" for integration because of the risk of transmission and that reasonable
accommodation would not eliminate the risk. However, the court's analysis was extremely
cursory.

20. Prior to 1986, the Act used the term "handicapped individual." The term was changed in
response to the perception that the term had negative connotations. H. R. REP. No. 571, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3471, 3487. However,
no change in meaning was intended, and old cases are applicable to the Act as currently worded.
21. Discrimination can be established by showing that segregation deprives the inmates of
access to facilities and programs of the same caliber. Alternatively, even if the facilities and
programs are "separate but equal," discrimination will still be established, i.e., segregation itself
constitutes discrimination under section 504. Indeed, the Act was partially motivated by a
concern for the segregation of the handicapped from the rest of society. See, e.g., 118 CONG.
REC. S525 (dally ed. Jan. 20, 1972) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
Various regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act recognize this form of discrimination.
For example, Department of Health and Human Services regulations provide that:
(1) A recipient, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not . . .on the basis of
handicap:
(iv) Provide different or separate aid, benefits or services to handicapped persons or to any
class of handicapped persons unless such action is necessary to provide qualified
handicapped persons with aid, benefits, or services that are as effective as those provided to
others.
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assistance, and that (4) the correctional facility practice such discrimination solely on the basis of handicap.
There is little dispute that section 504 applies to state prisons that
receive federal funding. Regulations contemplate the Act's application to inmates of federal penal institutions, 22 and offer the "department of corrections" as an example in the definition of the word
"program.
Moreover, federal courts have entertained challenges to
both federal and state prison conditions by handicapped prisoners
under section 504.24
This Article analyzes the relationship between Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the segregation of HIV-positive inmates when
the segregation is justified on grounds that integration poses a risk of
transmission of the virus to other inmates and prison staff. Part I discusses the dynamics of the segregation of HIV-positive inmates in four

sections. The first section covers the epidemiology of HIV infection in
correctional facilities, including statistics on the incidence and growth
of the virus. The second section contains a discussion of the various
responses of prisons to HIV infection, with an emphasis on the differ-

ent types of segregation. The third section discusses the significance of
the segregation of HIV-positive inmates, focusing on the harm that
segregation causes. Finally, the fourth section addresses arguments
other than the prevention of transmission that are asserted in defense
of segregation.
The remainder of the Article concentrates on the first and second
prongs of a section 504 violation.2 5 Part II addresses whether HIV
45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b) (1989). See also 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(b)(iii), (d)(1989) (Department of Justice
regulations).
Finally, courts assume that the segregation of handicapped individuals is governed by section
504. Se4 eg., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir.
1979).
22. 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(d)(ii) (1989). These regulations were promulgated by the Justice
Department, pursuant to an amendment to the Act extending its application to programs
conducted by all executive agencies.
23. 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(h) (1989).
24. See, eg., Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988) (whether failure to provide deaf
inmate with qualified interpreter violates section 504 presents triable issue of fact); Harris v.
Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1582-83 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (section 504 not violated by segregation
of seropositive inmates); Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21, 39-40 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (court
ordered a study of measures needed to ensure the state penitentiary's compliance with section
504); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (N.D. W. Va. 1976) (denial to plaintiff-prisoner
of access to vocational rehabilitation programs for the allegedly mentally ill violates section 504).
25. I do not analyze what are the most easily answered and least interesting issues in this
context-the third and fourth requirements mentioned above (that the discrimination occur in a
program receiving federal financial assistance and be practiced on the basis of handicap). The
analysis of this Article is only applicable where the prison in which the inmates are housed
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positivity is a "handicap" under the Act. The discussion in Part II is
divided into three sections: (1) formal definitions contained in the Act
and implementing regulations; (2) coverage of symptomatic infection;
and (3) coverage of asymptomatic HIV positivity. Part III considers
whether HIV-positive inmates are "otherwise qualified" to be integrated into the general prison population. The discussion is divided
into four sections: (1) who bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff is "otherwise qualified"; (2) the appropriate level of scrutiny to be
given to the justifications offered by prison authorities; (3) whether the
integration of HIV-positive inmates poses a significant risk of transmission of the virus in both the non-prison and prison contexts; and
(4) the requirement that recipients of federal financial assistance provide reasonable accommodation for the handicapped.
I.

THE DYNAMICS OF SEGREGATION: WHO IT AFFECTS,
WHAT IT ENTAILS, AND WHY IT IS EMPLOYED

A.

The Epidemiology of HIV Infection in CorrectionalFacilities

As of October 1, 1988, there had been a total of 3,136 AIDS cases
among inmates in seventy responding federal, state, and local correctional systems in the United States.2 6 The incidence rate of AIDS is
higher in correctional systems than in the population at large because
of the concentration in inmate populations of persons with histories of
receives federal financial assistance, and the challenged segregation is practiced solely on the
basis of HIV positivity. The definition of federal financial assistance has been construed broadly.
See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 (1984) (antidiscrimination
provision "should not be limited to programs that receive federal aid the primary purpose of
which is to promote employment"); Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 763
(1 lth Cir. 1985), afid, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (where impact aid is deposited into a general fund,
Act applies to all activities paid for out of that fund).
"Solely on the basis of handicap" refers to differential treatment of a handicapped individual
by reason of the individual's status as a handicapped individual, i.e., a recipient of federal funds is
not free to argue that the granting of benefits to the handicapped will lead to other burdens and it
is because of those other burdens that the recipient is treating the handicapped person differently.
See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605 (1986)
(" 'Congress apparently determined that it would require . . . grantees to bear the costs of
providing employment for the handicapped .......") (quoting Darrone, 465 U.S. at 633 n.13). See
also Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center, 672 F. Supp. 1226 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (refusal to admit
hepatitis-B carrier to vocational program because of increased costs required to inoculate staff
designated to work with plaintiff constitutes discrimination solely on the basis of handicap). If
Congress had not intended this to be the case, section 504 would be ineffective because recipients
could always try to justify failure to extend equal benefits to an individual with handicaps on the
grounds of consequential burdens such as increased costs.
26. 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at 9.
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high-risk behavior, particularly intravenous drug use.2 7 The incidence
rate of AIDS in the entire United States population was 13.3 cases per
100,000 persons in 1988, up from 8.6 in 1987 and 3.4 in 1985.28 Incidence rates for individual states ranged from zero to thirty-nine per
100,000, with most states under ten. In state and federal correctional
systems, incidence rates ranged from zero to 536 per 100,000,
although more than one-half of the states had rates less than twentyfive and only eight had rates over 100. The aggregate incidence rate
for these systems was seventy-five cases per 100,000 inmates in 1988,
up from fifty-four in 1987.29 Rates in city and county jail systems
varied from zero to 2,038 cases per 100,000 in 1988, but one-half of
the jurisdictions had rates under twenty-five. The aggregate incidence
rate for all responding city and county systems was 183 per 100,000
inmates. 30 The growth in AIDS cases in correctional systems was
slightly lower than that in the population at large from 1985 to 1986,
1986 to 1987, and 1987 to 1988.31
Ninety-five percent of inmate AIDS cases in the United States have
been among men as of October 1988.32 Virtually all inmate AIDS
cases are thought to be related to intravenous drug use or sexual activity, with approximately two-thirds attributed to the former mode of
transmission.33 Accordingly, intravenous drug use is a much more
critical transmission category in correctional AIDS cases than in
AIDS in the population at large.34
The distribution of AIDS cases across the United States is very uneven, 35 although correctional AIDS cases have increased in all regions
since 1985 and the regional distribution is less uneven than it was several years ago.3 6
27. AIDS IN CORRECIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 25; 1988 UPDATE, supranote 2, at
11.
28. 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at 11.
29. Id.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 9. The actual statistics are a 61% increase in correctional cases from 1985 to 1986
and a 79% increase in the population at large; a 59% increase in correctional cases from 1986 to
1987 and a simultaneous 61% increase in the general population; and a 60% increase in
correctional cases from 1987 to 1988 and a 76% increase in the population at large. Id.
32. Id. at 11.
33. AIDS INCORRECTIONAL FACILITES, supra note 2, at 26; 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at

11.
34. AIDS N CoRRECTIoNAL FACILMiES, supra note 2, at 26-28.
35. Id. at 23-24; 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at 11-12.
36. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 24; 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at
11-12.
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These statistics are not necessarily reliable. Most correctional systems do not keep statistics on cases by year reported. Indeed, using
the current number of AIDS cases among inmates may slightly underestimate the actual annual incidence rate in a correctional system.37
Moreover, rapid population turnover makes statistics from city and
county jail systems extremely suspect.3 8 Finally, the method of calculating incidence rates per 100,000 population guarantees that a correctional system with a very small number of AIDS cases, the typical
case, will have a somewhat higher rate than a much larger outside
population with substantially more AIDS cases.3 9
The number of ARC cases among inmates is unclear because of definitional variations and uneven record-keeping. Those with ARC test
positive for HIV, however, so they are included in statistics on HIV
prevalence among correctional inmates. Although statistics on HIV
prevalence are also not entirely clear, an increasing number of jurisdictions have instituted HIV antibody screening and testing programs.
The aggregate results of mass screening programs by fourteen states
and the Federal Bureau of Prisons show that HIV-prevalence rates
among inmates varied from 0% to 5.2% with over half of the groups
under 1%.' Figures derived from mass testing are generally comparable to estimated HIV-prevalence rates in the population at large.4 1
Of those ten states that conducted and reported the results of blind
epidemiological studies on new inmates, rates varied from 0% to
17%.42
However, more than half the states reported rates of less than
43
1%.

B. Prisons' Responses to HIV Infection
Responses to HIV infection in correctional facilities are diverse.
Many systems still segregate all inmates with AIDS, while only a few
segregate all asymptomatically infected inmates from the general population.' Several systems maintain HIV-positive inmates in the gen37. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 33 n.7.

38. Id. at 25.
39. Id.
40. 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at 13. These figures involved mandatory, identity-linked
testing of all incoming inmates, all current inmates, or all releases. Id. at 14. However, these
statistics must be viewed with caution because the correctional systems in the states with the
largest number of AIDS cases have not undertaken mass screening programs. Id.
41.

AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 28.

42. 1988 Update, supra note 2, at 15.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 34; see also Appendices A & B.
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eral population.'a Moreover, in the past few years, there has been a
trend away from blanket segregation policies toward case-by-case
placement decision-making. 4 Increasingly, correctional systems base
housing decisions on multiple objectives: providing care consistent
with medical need, protecting the inmate from harm at the hands of
others, and preventing transmission of HIV within the institution. At
the same time, however, many systems are coming under significant
pressure to segregate all asymptomatic HIV-positive and ARC
inmates.4 7
L

MaintainingInmates in the GeneralPrison Population Without
Special Programmingor Restrictions

No state or federal systems maintain inmates with AIDS in the general population without special programming or restrictions. Sixteen
percent have adopted such a policy for ARC victims, and 47% have
adopted such a policy for asymptomatic HIV-infected inmates.4 8
Four percent of city and county jail systems take this approach for
AIDS victims, 14% for ARC victims, and 54% for asymptomatic
HIY-positive inmates.49
As these statistics reveal, many systems maintain HIV-positive
inmates, particularly those without symptoms, in the general prison
population without any special provisions. A number of these prisons
maintain all asymptomatic HIV-positive inmates and all inmates with
ARC in the general population without special restrictions. A few systems presumptively house all three categories of HIV-infected inmates
in the general population unless an individual's medical needs, safety,
or high-risk behavior dictate otherwise. It is more common, however,
to segregate AIDS cases and to presumptively house asymptomatic
HIV-positive inmates and inmates with ARC in the general population with provision for their segregation when the above mentioned
considerations dictate otherwise. This is the approach taken by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons.5"
45. I at 34. Some of these systems provide special programming for these inmates or
impose restrictions on them. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing what is
meant by special programming).

46. Id. at 33.
47. AIDS INCORRECTIONAL FAcLITEs, supra note 2, at 84; 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at
33.
48. See Appendix A.
49. See Appendix B.
50. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 84-85. The 1988 UPDATE, supra
note 2, did not update this information.
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2. Maintaining Inmates in the GeneralPopulation with Special
Programming
Two percent of state and federal systems maintain AIDS victims in
the general population with special programing, 18% take this
approach for ARC victims, and 24% for inmates with asymptomatic
HIV infection;" in city and county jail systems, 7% take this
approach for AIDS, 7% for ARC and 11% for asymptomatic HIV
2
infection.1
Special programming is designed to reduce the possibility that
infected inmates will transmit HIV to others. For example, in a jurisdiction where housing two inmates per cell is prevalent, special programming may include housing inmates with HIV together. Other
jurisdictions simply house them in single cells, as they do non-infected
inmates.
Special programming may also include restrictions on work assignments. Forty-five percent of federal and state systems and 36% of city
and county systems have adopted such a policy. 3 Restrictions include
the exclusion of HIV-positive inmates from, among other things, food
service, medical, dental, and laundry duties. Although correctional
systems generally acknowledge that such restrictions are not medically
necessary, they have been instituted to forestall any potential alarm in
the prison population. Some systems exclude infected inmates from
work release programs in the community in order to maintain public
support for such programs.54
3. Segregation
Thirty-nine percent of state and federal prisons segregate all inmates
with AIDS; 16% segregate all those with ARC; and 12% segregate all
asymptomatic HIV-positive inmates." Forty-six percent of city and
county jails segregate all inmates with AIDS; 21% segregate all those
with ARC; and 11% segregate all those with asymptomatic HIV
infection. 6
Every jurisdiction places inmates with confirmed AIDS diagnoses in
some hospital or infirmary setting when they are seriously ill. Some
states place these inmates in community hospitals; others states main51.
52.
53.
2, did
54.
55.
56.
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tain them in correctional medical facilities, as does the Federal Bureau
of Prisons; and still other states do both. Within medical facilities,
some jurisdictions isolate and quarantine inmates with AIDS. At least
two jurisdictions, California and New York City, have centralized the

of all inmates with AIDS in a single correctional medical
treatment
57
facility.

Though hospital and infirmary settings are generally designed for
medical treatment and evaluation, some jurisdictions also use these

facilities to separate inmates with AIDS from the general correctional
population.
Of those jurisdictions adopting segregative policies, some admit
AIDS cases to hospital facilities when the prisoners are acutely ill but

return them to a non-hospital special unit in the correctional facility
when they are in remission. Others mainstream them into the general
prison population when the disease is in remission.
Some jurisdictions permanently segregate confirmed AIDS cases in

either hospitals or administrative settings immediately upon diagnosis.
Others apply this policy only to AIDS and ARC cases. Finally, a few
permanently segregate all three categories of
systems, including Texas,
58

HIY-infected inmates.

4. Case-by-Case Determination
Fifty-nine percent of state and federal systems employ a case-by-

case policy for AIDS, 45% for ARC, and 16% for asymptomatic
infection. Forty-three percent of city and county systems employ such
a policy for AIDS, 50% for ARC, and 25% for asymptomatic
infection.5 9
57. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FAcrLimS, supra note 2, at 87 (Vacaville State Prison in
California and Rikers Island Hospital in New York).
58. Id. at 86-87. California's policy of housing all its HIV-positive inmates in one wing at the
Correctional Medical Facility in Vacaville was challenged in the Second Amended Complaint at
23-24, 27-30, Gates v. Deukmejian, No. CIVS 87-1636 LKK-JFM (E.D. Cal. filed January 27,
1989) (on fie with the Washington Law Review). The case settled and the consent decree
provided for institution of a "pilot program" to determine the feasibility of placing HIV-positive
inmates in a general population program at the prison. Screening for eligible inmates was to be
done on a case-by-case basis, according to various criteria including: history of assaultive
behavior, history of sexual behavior of a kind that poses a risk of transmission of the HIV virus;
history of drug use or possession of intravenous drug paraphernalia; history of propensity to prey
or be preyed upon; medical condition of the inmate, and the inmate's preference for segregation
or integration. Consent Decree at 25-27, Gates v. Deukmejian, No. CIVS 87-1636 LKK-JFM
(E.D. Cal. filed Dec. 8, 1989, approved by Judge Karlton Feb. 1990) (on fie with the Washington
Law Review). The decree also requires evaluation of the program nine to 11 months after the
effective date of the agreement. Id. at 26. The outcome of that evaluation was not available
before publication of this Article.
59. See Appendices A & B.
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A range of considerations factor into such decisions, including the
inmate's medical situation, safety, and likelihood of infecting others.
Some jurisdictions make all housing and programming decisions on a
case-by-case basis. Other jurisdictions have blanket policies of segregation for one or two of the three categories, with a policy of integrating others except when particularized considerations dictate
otherwise.
Some jurisdictions attempt to identify prisoners who
might be victimized and to offer them special housing.'
A policy based on case-by-case determinations is flexible and recognizes that each case is unique. However, the lack of uniform policies
may lead to concerns of arbitrary in decision-making.
C. The Harm Caused by Segregation
The burdens imposed by the segregation of HIV-positive inmates
vary, depending on the circumstances of the segregation.6 1
1.

Inferior Programs,Facilities,and Services

Experience has shown that it is difficult to offer a full range of programs and activities to segregated or separated inmates. Such inmates
are commonly denied access to various programs and facilities, including work, education, religious services, recreation, law libraries, visits
and conjugal visits.62 For example, inmates in the "AIDS Wing" at
Vacaville Prison in California alleged that they were subjected to
worse housing conditions; they were denied access to the law library,
the main exercise yard, and other facilities; they had less access to
medical, psychiatric, and other services; their contact with peers and
families was limited and often denied; and finally, they were deprived
of opportunities for various therapeutic, occupational, educational,
and rehabilitative activities and support services.63
One might argue that a denial of access to various benefits is a small
hardship to impose to protect other inmates from a deadly disease.
While this may be true where integration poses a significant risk of
transmission of the disease, when transmission is not a threat, as the
discussion below reveals, this denial of benefits is difficult to justify.
60. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 88.
61. In those situations where HIV-infected inmates remain in the general prison population,
with or without special programming, they are generally treated like non-infected inmates, with
like access to programs, facilities, and work assignments. See supra notes 48-54 and
accompanying text.
62. 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at 36.
63. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 58, at 23-24, 28.
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As the amount and extent of denied benefits decrease, the situation
moves toward a "separate but equal" one. In such situations, it arguably takes a lower risk of transmission to justify segregation. Indeed,
it is at least theoretically possible that HIV-infected inmates could be
segregated in an entirely separate but equal setting. In such a situation, the harm to the segregated inmates is not a loss of services. However, other harms result.
2. Stigma
Judicial review of official segregation began with the separate but
equal doctrine. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 4 the Supreme Court upheld a
state statute requiring the racial segregation of railroad car passengers.
The rationale for the decision was the lack of cognizable harm to the
black plaintiffs because the facilities were objectively "equal." 65 More
than half a century later, the Court was presented with the constitutionality of an objectively equal school system segregated on the basis
of race in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education.6 6 The
Court found segregated public education to be "inherently unequal"
because it imposed irreparable harm on the black minority,
"generat[ing] a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community." 67 Although Brown involved a racial classification and thus is
not controlling in this situation, the case presumed that a segregative
classification imposes stigma on the racial minority.
Perpetuation of a system that separates and isolates those infected
with HIV can be based on a variety of stigmatic assumptions. Society
has responded to AIDS with a concern bordering on hysteria. 68 AIDS
has become a national obsession.69 The repeated assertions of medical
specialists that large quantities of the virus are needed to transmit the
disease, that those quantities are transmitted only through blood and
semen, and that casual contact does not result in infection, has not
quieted the public's anxiety.7"
This hysteria is exacerbated in the prison setting where drug abuse
and homosexual activity are more common and where inmates and
64. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
65. Id.
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
67. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
68. Disease Detectivev The AIDS Hysteria, TIME, July 4, 1983, at 50; J. Schwartz, The AIDS
Scare-Fearof ContractingDiseaseSpreadingAcross the Country, Poughkeepsie J., July 4, 1983,

at 9.
69. Pear, Health Chief Calls AIDS Battle 'No.1 Priority; N.Y. Times, May 25, 1983, at Al,

col. 3.
70. Langone, AIDS Special Report, DISCOVER, Dec. 1985, at 28-32.
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staff live and work in close and often unsanitary quarters. When
patients with AIDS are discovered in the prison setting, there is a crescendo of concern leading to panic on the part of prisoners, correctional staff, and medical staff.7 In Tallahassee, Florida, prisoners
almost rioted when prison guards ordered them to remove the mattress of a prisoner believed to have AIDS.7 2 In New Jersey, prisoners
fear contracting AIDS from dirty dishes and often bring their own
utensils to meals.73 A Minnesota prison imposed a ten-day lockup to
prevent panic after the state prison's first AIDS-related case was diagnosed. The diagnosis caused unrest among inmates and rumors of
such demonstrations as mass movements to sick call.74
These responses lay bare the stigma associated with this disease.
Moreover, the societal groups most heavily hit by the disease, homosexuals and intravenous drug users, are themselves socially stigmatized groups. In sum, the disease presents a grave risk that responses
are motivated by panic and fear, rather than by judgments based on a
careful assessment of the risks involved in integration. "The isolation
of the chronically ill and of those perceived to be ill or contagious
appears across cultures and centuries, as does the development of
complex and often pernicious mythologies about the nature, cause,
and transmission of illness." 75 HIV infection is susceptible to repetition of that pattern. For this reason, decisions that single out those
with the disease for special treatment must be tested against reality
rather than myth.
3.

Diminished Rehabilitation and Reintegration

Prison systems and corrections experts are split between rehabilitation-oriented systems and punishment-oriented ones, with the current
trend favoring the latter.7 6 Because release follows incarceration for
most prisoners, however, under any set of correctional objectives society must be concerned about the reintegration of inmates into society
as a matter of sound policy. Segregation of HIV-positive inmates is
inimical to reintegration because it produces an environment that does
71.
72.
73.
74.

Pear, Prisons Are on the Alert Against AIDS, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1986, at 28E, col. 1.
Patton, Prison Health and AIDS, Gay Community News, Apr. 7, 1984, at 6.
Id.
Williams, AIDS in Prison: Coping with a Strange New Death Penalty, CORRECTnONS
COMPENDIUM, Feb. 1986, at 1-2.
75. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 n.12 (1987) (citing R. DUBOS &
J. DUBos, THE WHITE PLAGUE (1952); S.SONTAG, ILLNESS As METAPHOR (1978)).
76. See Frank, The American Prison: The End of an Era, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1979, at 3,
5.
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not correspond to the world that prisons are preparing inmates to
reenter and thereby makes the readjustment more difficult.
Although AIDS is classified as a fatal disease, the concern about
reintegration remains applicable: many HIV-infected people remain
asymptomatic for many years and even full-fledged AIDS cases can go
into remission for extended periods of time.
Moreover, the segregation of these inmates may run counter to the
goals of rehabilitation by further souring the infected prisoners against
society both because of the perceived message that these inmates are
not "fit" for integration and because an environment characterized by
a fatal disease is unlikely to be a regenerative one.
4. Punishment of Status
American jurisprudence is characterized by a distaste for a penal
system that imposes punishment on the basis of status. In Robinson v.
77
California,
the Supreme Court ruled that it violated the cruel or unusual punishment clause to punish someone for being a narcotics
addict. The Court focused on the illegitimacy of punishing someone
for having a disease:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to
make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to
be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might [require treatment].
But... a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 8
Although cruel and unusual punishment challenges to segregation
have failed, 79 Robinson reveals a fundamental value of our penal system. Segregation on the basis of a fatal, contagious disease, about
which little is known, presents a high risk of being a fearful, ignorant
effort to punish the victims of the disease. Accordingly, prison authorities ought to explore alternatives to segregation and the courts ought
to carefully examine segregative policies.
D.

Other Arguments Supporting Segregation

Various justifications other than the prevention of transmission of
HIV are asserted on behalf of blanket segregation: (1) hospitalization
is medically indicated for infected inmates; (2) segregation protects
HIV-infected inmates from the attacks of other inmates; and (3) segre77. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
78. Id at 667.
79. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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gation protects the infected inmates from common viruses that occasionally sweep through the general prison population, to which HIVinfected individuals are more susceptible.
It is difficult, and perhaps unwise, to assess these justifications in the
abstract. A decision on whether to segregate, as with all other policy
decisions, involves a balancing of competing interests. My thesis is not
that segregation is never justified; rather, it is that intelligent, reasoned
policy choices, instead of ignorant, rash decisions, are warranted in
response to a disease like AIDS. Moreover, the gravity of the burdens
imposed by segregation militate in favor of segregation only when
other reasonable procedures cannot eliminate the feared danger.
In some situations, the harms detailed above are outweighed by the
interest in segregation, for example, when hospitalization is required
for medical reasons. In such cases, the prison authorities' justification
for segregation is to protect the health of the inmate rather than to
protect other inmates from the risk of transmission. Moreover, the
ramifications of hospitalization can be minimized by returning an
HIV-infected person whose symptoms have gone into remission into a
different facility so other inmates would not be aware that the inmate
was infected. Various jurisdictions have experimented positively with
this approach. °
When segregation is justified on the ground that it protects HIVpositive inmates from the attacks of other inmates, there are means
less discriminatory than a blanket policy of segregation. For example,
the segregation of aggressors rather than their victims, increased surveillance, and segregation on a case-by-case basis when other options
are either unreasonable or ineffective, more adequately accommodate
the competing interests.
A blanket segregation policy is difficult to justify in terms of protecting infected inmates from viruses. Inmates whose disease has
progressed to the point of inability to fight off infection are generally
hospitalized, while those who are asymptomatic manage without incident in the general population. If the individual is particularly susceptible to common viruses, segregation may be justified-but the
individual risk does not justify a blanket segregation policy.
In sum, prisons quite readily resort to blanket segregation policies
for one or more of the AIDS-related categories. Such segregation has
grave consequences. Moreover, a blanket policy of segregation is not
justifiable as a means to protect infected inmates from other inmates or
80. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL
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from common viruses. Whether it is justifiable as a means to prevent
transmission of the virus is discussed later in this Article.
II.

HIV POSITIVITY IS A "HANDICAP" UNDER THE ACT

A.

Definitions Under the Act

The Act defines "handicapped individual""1 as "any person who (i)
has a physical... impairment which substantially limits one or more
of [his or her] major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (ii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 2 Department of Health and Human Services regulations define "physical
impairment" to mean any "physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense
organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; heric and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine."83 In addition, the regulations define "major life activities"
as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
4
working."
Individuals "regarded as having... an impairment" include:
those persons who do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as having as well as those persons whose mental or physical condition does not substantially limit their life activities and who thus are
not technically within [the first clauses of the definition]. Members of
both of these groups may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of
their being regarded as handicapped. 5
The regulations state:
"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical or
mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities
81. The only case that has addressed whether the segregation of HIV-positive inmates
violated section 504 assumed that the plaintiffs were "handicapped." Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F.
Supp. 1564, 1582 (M.D. Ala. 1990). The court offered no analysis of this issue, although the
issue poses interesting questions especially as to asymptomatic carriers.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1989). This section begins with the substantive requirements
under this element rather than with a discussion of which party bears the burden of proof on the
issue. Unlike the discussion of the "otherwise qualified" element, the law in this area is clearly
established and not muddled by a split of authority: the plaintiff's prima facie case must include a

showing that he or she is handicapped under the Act. Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658
F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981).
83. 45 C.F.R. § 84.30")(2)(i)(A) (1989).
84. Id. § 84.30)(2)(ii).
85. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6373, 6389-90.

855

Washington Law Review

Vol. 65:839, 1990

but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B)
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph 0)(2)(i)
of this section but is treated by a recipient as having such an
86
impairment.
B.

Symptomatic Disease that Limits Major Life Activity

In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,8 7 the Supreme Court
decided that the Act covered symptomatic, contagious diseases. In
Arline, the plaintiff was hospitalized in 1957 for tuberculosis. The disease went into remission for the next twenty years, during which time
the plaintiff began teaching school. After a series of relapses, she was
discharged by the defendant school board because of the continued
recurrence of the disease. She brought suit alleging a section 504 violation. The Court found that the plaintiff's hospitalization for a respiratory illness in 1957 sufficed to establish that she had a record of
impairment which substantially limited one or more of her major life
activities.88 In response to the defendant's argument that the contagious nature of the handicap removed it from section 504's coverage,
the Court ruled that Congress was as concerned about the effect of an
impairment on others as it was about its effect on the individual.8 9
The Court reasoned that Congress' inclusion of those who are
regarded as impaired reveals its acknowledgement that "society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment." 9°
HIV infection has no independent symptoms except dementia similar to that found in Alzheimer's Disease. Otherwise, an AIDS diagnosis is based on the presence of "indicator diseases" found in individuals
whose immune systems are compromised. The two most common
indicator diseases are pneumonia and Kaposi's sarcoma, a form of
skin cancer. Other AIDS indicator diseases include progressive, seriously disabling, and even fatal conditions. 9 1
Thus, both symptomatic AIDS sufferers and those who were formerly symptomatic but whose symptoms have relapsed are covered by
86. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1989).
87. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).

88. Id. at 281.
89. Id. at 284.
90. Id.
91.
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the Act. The former have, and the latter have a record of, a physical
impairment, here, a physiological disorder that affects the hemic, lymphatic, and reproductive systems.9 2 Moreover, this impairment substantially limits one or more of his or her major life activities. When
an impairment is serious enough to require hospitalization, it is "more
than sufficient to establish" a substantial limitation on one or more of
the major life activities.9 3 And even when symptoms do not lead to or
necessarily require hospitalization, once HIV positivity has progressed
to an AIDS diagnosis, one or more seriously disabling conditions are
present. Accordingly, both prior and subsequent to Arline, lower
courts have ruled that symptomatic AIDS is a handicap under the
Act.

94

C. ARC and Asymptomatic HIV Infection
Those who have tested positive for the virus and are either asymptomatic or whose symptoms are not grave enough to require hospitalization, or to substantially limit one or more major life activity, pose a
more difficult question.9 5 Specifically mentioning AIDS, the Arline
Court expressly did not rule on whether a carrier of a contagious disease could be considered to have a physical impairment, or whether
such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act.96 In Arline, the
handicap gave rise both to a physical impairment and to
contagiousness.9 7
It is clear that HIV positivity, whether symptomatic or not, is a
"physical impairment" under the Act. Regulations defining "impairment" do not require symptoms as evidence of adverse physiological
effects. 98 While the disorder or condition must affect the body in some
way, the regulations do not say this effect must be perceptible to the
afflicted individual. 99 The use of such neutral terms as "condition"
and "affect," which do not speak of symptoms or adverse physiologi92. Brief Amici Curiae of Doctors for AIDS Research and Education at 43, Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (No. 85-1277) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae].
93. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
94. See, eg., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988); Chalk v. United States
Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F.
Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d
398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
95. For additional discussion of this subject, see Note, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS
Virus as a Handicap Under the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (1988).
96. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7.
97. Id, at 282.

98. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
99. Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 65:839, 1990

cal effects, suggests that "impairment" can cover both symptomatic
and asymptomatic illness.
Even when asymptomatic, HIV infection adversely affects the
hemic, lymphatic, and reproductive systems.°'° The mere presence of
the virus results in a heightened risk of future symptomatic illness and
in an impaired ability to fight infection and a consequential increased
risk of contracting outside infection. 1 Moreover, the danger of contagion makes reproduction and sexual intercourse dangerous activities
because of potential transmission. 0 2 Thus, asymptomatic HIV infection would qualify as a "physical impairment" under the Act.
In order to be a "handicap," the physical impairment must substantially limit a major life activity."0 3 These activities are those that are a
normal and integral part of life." Asymptomatic disease would qualify as substantially limiting a major life activity on either of two alternate grounds: HIV positivity is a physical impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity although not outwardly so; or
HIV-positive persons, when they are treated differently than
uninfected persons and are thereby substantially limited, or perceived
to be limited, in a major life activity, are being "regarded as having...
[such] an impairment."'' 0 5
In support of the former argument, asymptomatic HIV infection
limits the major life activities of sexual intercourse and reproduction
because of the risk of transmission in these activities. 0 6 While the
regulations do not explicitly include these activities as "major life
activities," that list is not exhaustive. The fundamental importance
generally attached to sexual and reproductive activity mandates their
inclusion.
Courts have accepted this reasoning, albeit in dicta. In Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified School District,0 7 the court stated that "[e]ven
those who are asymptomatic have abnormalities in their hemic and
reproductive systems making procreation and childbirth dangerous to
themselves and others." And in Local 1812, American Federation of
100. Brief Amiei Curiae, supra note 92, at 43.
101. Redfield, Wright & Tramont, The Walter Reed Staging Classificationfor HTVL-IIII
LAVInfection, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 131, 132 (1986).
102. See infra notes 182-83, 188 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
104. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1989).
105. That is, the first two sections of the regulations defining "is regarded as having an
impairment" would apply. 45 C.F.R. 84.3(j)(2)(iv)(A)-.3(j)(2)(iv)(B) (1989). See supra note 88
and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 182-83, 188 and accompanying text.
107. 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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Government Employees v. United States Department of State,'0 8 the
court found that the "great majority of HIV carriers are physically
impaired and handicapped... due to measurable deficiencies in their
immune systems, even where disease symptoms have not yet
developed.""' 9
Case law, legislative history and controlling regulations also support
the second argument, that is, that differential treatment of one with a
contagious disease on the basis of fear of contagion, such that he or
she is thereby rendered unable, or perceived as unable, to engage in a
major life activity, renders that person handicapped under the Act.
The definition of "handicapped individual" under section 504 was
amended to include one "regarded as having . . . an impairment
[which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities]." This change reflected congressional concern with protecting
the handicapped against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, but from "archaic attitudes and laws" and from "the
fact that the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps." 1 10
Thus, this section precludes discrimination against "those persons
who do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as
having, as well as those persons whose mental or physical condition
Moreover, the regdoes not substantially limit their life activities."'
ulations define "is regarded as having an impairment" to include
actual as well as perceived impairment." 2
While explicitly avoiding the issue of asymptomatic infection, the
Arline Court implicitly supported its inclusion by stressing that the
attitudes of others towards a handicap, and not merely the effect of the
handicap on the afflicted individual, were important in determining
the Act's coverage."' In response to the defendant's argument that
the contagiousness of plaintiff's tuberculosis removes the disease from
coverage as a "handicap," the Court wrote:
[S]ociety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are
as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment. Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of
public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness. Even those who
108. 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987).
109. Id
110. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6400.
111. Id at 39, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6389-90.

112. 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(iv) (1989).
113. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987).
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from noninfectious diseases . . . have faced discrimination

based on the irrational fear that they might be contagious. The Act is
carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound
judgments....

[E]xclusion [of contagious persons] would mean [they]

would never have the opportunity to have their condition evaluated in
light of medical evidence and
a determination made as to whether they
'1 14
were "otherwise qualified."
In Arline, the plaintiff was denied her job because school authorities
feared contagion;1 15 "working" is included in the regulations' list of
"major life activities."' 16 On such a reading, the fear or prejudice is
seen either as the cause of a substantial limitation of a major life activity, or as leading to treatment of the handicapped individual as substantially limited in a major life activity.
Under such a rationale, asymptomatic HIV-positive inmates who
are segregated from the general prison population would also qualify
as "handicapped." The segregation is denying these inmates their
right to, among other things, speak and interact with other inmates.
Moreover, the inmates are being treated as substantially limited in
their ability to speak and interact with the other inmates.
Courts have adopted such reasoning. In Doe v. Centinela Hospita, 1 17 the court found that an asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff
excluded from the defendant's residential school and drug rehabilitation program was handicapped under the Act because the defendant
perceived the plaintiff as having a substantially limited ability to learn
how to deal with dependency problems in that particular program.
Similarly, in Doe v. Dolton Elementary School DistrictNo. 148, 118 the
court found that denial of interaction with other schoolchildren substantially limited the major life activity of interaction. Although the
child in Dolton had developed AIDS by the time the court issued its
determination of whether a preliminary injunction should issue, the
court made clear that the plaintiff child qualified as "handicapped" on
grounds that the child's impairment itself limited a major life activity,
and on alternate grounds that the child was being regarded as limited
in a major life activity.11 9
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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Id. at 284-85.
Id. at 291 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1989).
No. 87-2514 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Id. at 444--45.
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Cases analyzing asymptomatic conditions other than HIV infection
also support this reasoning. In Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning
Center,20 the court held that asymptomatic infection with the contagious virus hepatitis-B is a handicap because others' fear of the impairment substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to work and learn.12 '
Finally, other cases support a general finding that asymptomatic. HIV
infection is considered a "handicap" under the Act although the cases
were not explicit about the rationale. In Ray v. School District,2' 2 the
district court granted a preliminary injunction on behalf of two
asymptomatic HIV-positive children who had been barred from
attending public school. The children claimed discrimination under
both the Act and the Constitution. The court did not consider the
merits of any particular legal theory, but concluded that the children
were likely to succeed on the merits.'2 3 And in District27 Community
School Board v. Board of Education,124 the court stated that asymptomatic HIV carriers were protected by the Act because they "ha[ve] a
history of, or ha[ve] been misclassified as having" a handicap.125
In conclusion, HIV infection, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, ought to be considered a "handicap" under section 504. Such a
finding would follow from congressional concern that the response of
society to a handicap is as debilitating as a handicap itself.
III.

THE "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" ELEMENT

The most critical issue in this context is whether HIV-positive
inmates are qualified for integration in spite of their HIV positivity.
Section 504 does not prohibit an institution from requiring physical
qualifications for admission to a program.' 26 "Section 504... does
not compel.., institutions to disregard the disabilities of handicapped
individuals or to make substantial modifications in their programs to
allow disabled persons to participate .... An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite
of his handicap."' 12 7
120. 672 F. Supp. 1226 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
121. Id.at 1236.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
Id at 1536.
130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct 1986).
Id at 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (quoting Department of Education regulations).
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
Id. at 405-06 (emphasis added).
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Burden of Proof

This section begins with a discussion of who bears the burden of
proving that the plaintiff is or is not otherwise qualified-that is, qualified in spite of his or her handicap-for three reasons: the issue is
somewhat muddled; there is a split of authority; and it would prove
pivotal in a challenge to the segregation of HIV-positive inmates.
In cases where the defendant disclaims reliance on the handicap as a
factor in the alleged discrimination, courts typically rely on authority
developed under Title VII. 12 8 Thus, in such section 504 cases, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of a violation by showing
that she was otherwise qualified and that she was discriminated
against because of her handicap. The burden of production then shifts
to the defendant, who must demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his action.12 9 The plaintiff retains the "ultimate burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant discriminated against her on the basis of an impermissible
130
factor."
128. Under Title VII, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, by
showing, inter alia, that he or she was qualified for the job, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff. The plaintiff then
bears the burden of proving that the defendant's stated reason is a pretext for a racially
discriminatory decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1972).
129. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
130. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981). This paradigm applies to
"disparate treatment" cases, where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the particular plaintiff on the basis of an impermissible factor.
Contrast this with "disparate impact" cases, where the plaintiff challenges otherwise neutral
criteria on grounds that the criteria disproportionately exclude members of a protected group. In
Title VII cases, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating
that the application of a specific or particular employment practice creates a significant disparate
impact on a protected group. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124-25
(1989). The burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a business justification for
the employment practice. Id. at 2126. There is no requirement that the challenged practice be
indispensable or essential to the employer's business, but it must serve, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer. Id. at 2125-26. The burden of proving that
discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment practice
remains with the plaintiff at all times. Id. at 2126. If the plaintiff cannot persuade the trier of
fact on the question of the defendant's business necessity defense, the plaintiff can still prevail by
persuading the factfinder that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interests, thereby demonstrating that the
employer was using the test as a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Now that the law on burden-shifting in disparate impact cases is clear in the context of Title
VII, section 504 may follow suit. At present, jurisdictions are not in accord on the burden of
proof allocation in section 504 disparate impact cases. In Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991, 992-93
(9th Cir. 1985), the court applied the burden shifting scheme adopted in Wards Cove in the
context of section 504. However, in Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292,
309-10 (5th Cir. 1981), the court held that once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of
handicap discrimination, the burden of persuasion shifts to the federal employer to show that the
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However, in cases where the defendant acknowledges that the handicap was a central factor in the decision, as in the case of the segregation of HIV-positive inmates, this analysis is inapplicable. In such
cases, the pivotal issue is whether the defendant was justified in relying
on the handicap, rather than whether the defendant relied on a handicap at all. The analogue to this type of case under Title VII would be
the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception:'' the
defendant admits that the plaintiff was disparately treated but argues
that the treatment is justified. An employer can rely on the BFOQ
exception only by proving that "he had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all [members of the protected group] would be unable to perform safely and
32
efficiently the duties of the job involved."'
There is a good argument that the burden of proof ought to be allocated similarly in a section 504 challenge to the segregation of HIVpositive inmates. The allocation of the burden of proof in disparate
treatment cases is the same for both statutes.' 33 However, because
section 504 does not expressly create a BFOQ defense, the analogy is
not entirely persuasive. Furthermore, the analogy is complicated by
the fact that "otherwise qualified" has two potential meanings: that
the plaintiff is qualified apart from the handicap, or that the plaintiff is
qualified in spite of the handicap. The Supreme Court in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis1 interpreted the "otherwise qualified"
element under section 504 to have the latter meaning rather than the
former. 3 5 Thus, some courts that impose the burden of proof of the
"otherwise qualified" element on the defendant nevertheless require
36
the plaintiff to prove that he is qualified apart from the handicap.
physical criteria offered as justification for refusal to hire the plaintiff are job related such that
persons who suffer from the handicap cannot safely and efficiently perform the essentials of the
position in question. The plaintiff may then show that other selection criteria without a similar
discriminatory effect would also serve the employer's legitimate interest. Moreover, the burden
of proving the inability to reasonably accommodate the handicap remains on the employer. Id
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) provides in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees... on the basis... [of
a covered classification] where [the classification] is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
132. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969), quoted with
approval in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta

Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
133. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.

134. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
135. Iad at 406.
136. See, eg., Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
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There is a split of authority as to where the burden of proving that
the plaintiff is or is not qualified in spite of the handicap fans. Many
courts follow the BFOQ burden of proof allocation although none
draw the analogy. In the Ninth Circuit, an employer has the burden
of proving that a blanket policy of exclusion is reasonably required to
protect the health and safety of those who are denied jobs or terminated from employment. 137 Notwithstanding that the Ninth Circuit
relied on regulations pertaining specifically to "job qualifications" and
the importance of preserving job opportunities for the handicapped in
so holding, 138 California federal district courts, even in non-employment contexts, impose the burden of proof on the defendant. In one
case, the court interpreted Bentivegna to stand for the proposition that
whenever the defendant based his decision on a blanket policy of
exclusion, he has the burden of proof on the "otherwise qualified" element.1 39 In another case, the parents of a child infected with AIDS
challenged the school officials' decision not to allow the child to attend
regular kindergarten classes. The court held that the school had the
burden of demonstrating that the child was not "otherwise qualified"
to attend kindergarten.1 40
Various other circuits agree with this determination. The Tenth
Circuit held that once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that he was qualified apart from his handicap and was rejected on the basis of that handicap, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to show that the plaintiff was not otherwise
qualified, i.e., was not able to meet all of the program's requirements
in spite of his handicap. 141 The court found that such a holding followed from Southeastern Community College v. Davis.142 Similarly, in
Treadwell v. Alexander,4'3 the Eleventh Circuit held that once the
137. Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982) (City of
Los Angeles's policy of terminating diabetics who did not have their blood sugar under "control"
did not pass such a test).
138. Id. at 621.

139. Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. 87-2514 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file) (whether defendant hospital's exclusion of all HIV-positive patients from its residential
alcohol and drug rehabilitation program discriminated against patients who are "otherwise
qualified" presented a triable issue).
140. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
141.

Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981)

(university violated Act when it denied plaintiff admission to psychiatric residency program
because he suffered from multiple sclerosis).
142. 442 U.S. 397 (1979), cited in Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1386. See also Daubert v. United
States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1368-70 (10th Cir. 1984) (burden met by defendant in
discharge of employee with serious back injury where job required strenuous physical activity).
143. 707 F.2d 473 (1lth Cir. 1983).
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plaintiff shows that an employer denied him employment because of a
physical condition, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to
show that the criteria used were job related and that the plaintiff could
not safely and efficiently perform essential job requirements." 4 The
court went on to find that the defendant met this burden in rejecting
the plaintiffs application for an45 engineering position due to his nervousness and heart conditions.'
Not all courts, however, agree with such an allocation of the burden
of proof. In Doe v. New York University, " the plaintiff challenged her
discharge from medical school for psychiatric and medical disorders.
The court agreed that the plaintiff must first make out a prima facie
case of discrimination by showing that she was qualified apart from
her handicap and was denied admission or employment. However,
once the burden shifts to the defendant, the institution or employer
need only produce evidence that the handicap was relevant to qualifications for the position sought. The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that she was qualified
in spite of the handicap. 4 7
In sum, a determination of who bears the burden of proof on the
otherwise qualified element would depend on the law in the jurisdiction where the case is brought.
B.

The Level of Scrutiny

To assess the justification that segregation is required to protect the
health of other inmates and prison staff, a court would need to determine what level of scrutiny it will apply to justifications offered by
prison authorities.
L

Non-Prison Context

In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, the Court waffled on
the issue of the appropriate level of scrutiny in section 504 cases, asking whether the physical qualifications being demanded of the plaintiff
144. Id at 475.
145. IdL at 477.
146. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
147. Id. at 776-77; see also Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding that the reasons advanced for suspension of the handicapped plaintiff must go to
the essential purpose of the program); cf. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,
612 F.2d 644, 649 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979) (not reaching the issue of where burden of proof falls but
noting that the Act's enactment within a few months of the Supreme Court's Title VII decisi6n
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), must imply that Congress was
aware of the case's implications for section 504).
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were necessary for participation in the program, 4 8 yet stating its holding as "an educational institution [can] require reasonable physical
qualifications for admission to a clinical training program."' 4 9
Although many courts address claims of section 504 violations without a determination of what level of scrutiny is due the offered justifications, the weight of the little authority there is on the issue in the
non-prison context holds that heightened scrutiny is appropriate. The
Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the rational scrutiny test, finding
that "[a]n action challenged as discriminatory under the Rehabilitation Act must be given rigorous scrutiny."' 5 ° Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit has held that application of rational basis scrutiny would
"ignore the plain statutory language of § 504." 151 The Second Circuit
refused to determine the precise level of scrutiny appropriate in section
504 cases, but required "at least some substantial showing" that the
challenged action or scheme is justified. 5 2 Finally, in Garrity v. Gallen, 153 the court issued two conflicting holdings on this issue in the
same case: the rules under section 504 governing discrimination
against the handicapped appear to be governed by a" 'reasonableness'
standard,"' 5 4 and "Congress implicitly requires courts to apply
heightened judicial scrutiny-at least equivalent to that degree of scrutiny applied in sex discrimination cases-to allegations of discrimination against the mentally retarded under Section 504."'" 5 To reconcile
the two holdings, one may limit the second holding to discrimination
against the mentally retarded; under such a construction, that holding
would be inapplicable to the case at hand and Garritywould stand for
the more general proposition that the scrutiny appropriate under sec148. 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979). The plaintiff, who suffered from a serious hearing disability,
challenged her rejection from defendant's nursing program. The court concluded that the ability
to understand speech without reliance on lip reading was necessary for patient safety during the
clinical phase of the program and the performance of a nurse's regular duties. Id.
149. Id. at 414.
150. Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Bentivegna
v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1982).
151. Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981) (denying
admission to medical school on grounds that the plaintiff suffered from multiple sclerosis
constitutes a violation of the Act).
152. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir. 1979)
(rejecting justification of health hazards posed by integration of retarded children infected by
hepatitis-B with other retarded children as too remote and insubstantial).
153. 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981).
154. Id. at 207 (relying on differences between discrimination on basis of race and
discrimination against handicapped).
155. Id. at 237 (relying on a determination that section 504 incorporates the level of scrutiny
due the classification under the Constitution; at the time, prevailing view was that discrimination
against mentally retarded individuals was subject to intermediate scrutiny).
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tion 504 is that due the classification under the Constitution. Such a
holding is suspect. The Supreme Court apparently considered this
issue in its decision in Campbell v. Kruse.15 6 There, the plaintiffs
brought an action pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and the equal
protection clause, alleging the invalidity of a Virginia statute on the
ground that it denied handicapped children of poor parents the ability
to obtain an appropriate education. The district court found a violation of equal protection in the challenged policy.157 The Supreme
Court memorandum opinion remanded the case to the district court
with directions to decide the issue in accordance with section 504,158
thereby implying that a different analysis applies to section 504 claims
than to constitutional claims.
Thus, at least in the non-prison context, some form of heightened
scrutiny appears appropriate because of the unanimity of the federal
courts of appeals' decisions and the limited force of half a lower court
opinion to the contrary.
2. Prison Context
American jurisprudence draws a distinction between the law applicable to general society and that applicable to prisons.15 9 Because
penological objectives may be hindered by the application of the law
without this distinction, and prisoners have a unique relationship with
the state, this is a wise policy. For these reasons, one may argue, the
balance among competing considerations ought to be struck differently
in this context. Accordingly, the argument continues, the existing
non-prisoner cases interpreting section 504 are not applicable to the
prison context. Instead, a decision on whether segregation is justified
should give great deference to the determination of prison authorities
and minimal attention to the "right" of prisoners to be free from handicap discrimination.
While prisoners are generally understood to possess diminished
rights and prison authorities are generally granted great latitude in
decision-making, the courts have not abdicated all review of policy in
this area. The judiciary stands as a neutral decision-maker between
prisoners and prison authorities. In an area such as this, where fear
and ignorance can so easily influence decisions, the judiciary must
156. 434 U.S. 808 (1977) (mem.)
157. Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180, 186 (E.D. Va.), vacatedand remanded, 434 U.S.
808 (1977).
158. Campbell, 434 U.S. at 808.
159. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (legitimate objectives of the penal
institution curtail the constitutional rights of prisoners).
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ensure that the system remains true to its commitment to justifiable
policy choices.
The first issue is whether prisoners retain the "right" of protection
against handicap discrimination. Prisoners only retain those rights
that are not "fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or
incompatible with the objectives of incarceration."'"
Limitations on
very significant rights are justified in the prison context "both from the
fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives-including
deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security."' 6 1 Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
fourth amendment in his prison cell, because it would otherwise be
impossible to accomplish the prison objectives of preventing the intro16 2
duction of weapons, drugs, and other contraband into the premises.
' 63
However, "prisons are not beyond the reach of the Constitution."'
For example, the Court has held that prisoners have the constitutional
right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, and a
reasonable right of access to the courts."6 Prisoners enjoy limited
protection of religious freedom,' 65 free speech, 66 due process, 167 and
the eighth amendment.16 8 Most importantly, "invidious racial discrimination is as intolerable within a prison as outside, except as may
be essential to 'prison security and discipline.' ,169
The above case law, as well as the statute's clear application to prisons, 1 70 support the argument that inmates retain their right to be free
from handicap discrimination. This right is neither "fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment itself [nor] incompatible with the
171
objectives of incarceration."'
The second issue is the level of scrutiny to be applied to the justifications offered by prison authorities for segregation. In the constitu160. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (interest of society in the security of its
penal institutions outweighs the privacy interest of the prisoner within his cell).
161. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); accord Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
162. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 528.
163. Id. at 523.
164. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
165. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
166. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
167. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1973); Haine v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
168. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
169. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1983) (quoting in part from Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam)).
170. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
171. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523.
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tional arena, even if inmates retain a right, a prison regulation can
abridge that right if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
objectives.17 2 One might argue that such a weak standard of scrutiny
ought not to apply in section 504 cases for two reasons. First, the
holding ought to be limited to the constitutional context, and perhaps
extended to general statutory provisions, but not to specific statutory
rights of which Congress has deemed prisoners deserving. Second,
under Title VII, a statute to which courts often turn to interpret section 504, courts do not accord deference to the justifications offered by
prison authorities. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 7 3 the Supreme Court
held prison authorities to the same standards as other employers in
evaluating the defendant's claim that it was a BFOQ for prison guards
in contact positions in all-male penitentiaries to be men.17 4 Similarly,
' the
in Torres v.Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services, 75
plaintiffs, who were men, challenged the creation and implementation
of a policy that designated certain correctional officer positions in an
all-women prison as open to women only. In evaluating the defendant's response that the requirement was a BFOQ, the court wrote that
under Title VII "the claims of prison authorities about the needs of the
institution must satisfy the same burdens of proof as are imposed on
any employer attempting to meet the 'extremely narrow' BFOQ exception to Title VI.'176 The applicability of these cases is suspect, however, because they involved the assertion of rights by prison employees
rather than by inmates.
Even if a court determines that "rational basis" scrutiny applies, the
court ought to be diligent and uncompromising in its requirement that
reason, rather than fear and ignorance, guide prison authorities' decisions. Indeed, a court may find segregation violates even rational basis
scrutiny, given the state of the medical evidence discussed below.

172. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348

(1987).
173. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
174. Ia at 334 (the Court went on to find legitimate BFOQ where, among other things,
violence is extremely common in prison and a substantial portion of population is composed of
sex offenders).
175. 838 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1988).

176. Id at 949 n.4.
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In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,1 the plaintiff challenged the defendant's discharge of the plaintiff, an elementary school
teacher, after her third relapse of tuberculosis, a disease that had gone
into remission twenty years earlier. The Supreme Court recognized
the legitimate concern of the school board in avoiding the exposure of
others to significant health and safety risks. The Court held "[a] person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his
or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that
risk."17' 8 In determining whether an employee poses such a risk,
"courts normally should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of
'
public health officials." 179
The basic factors to be considered in the
context of a contagious disease include:
[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the
state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the
disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to
third parties) and (d) the probabilities
the disease will be transmitted
180
and cause varying degrees of harm.
A challenge to the segregation of HIV-positive prisoners presents no
genuine dispute over the first three of these factors: the HIV virus is
transferred only through the exchange of bodily fluids;18 1 the carrier is
infectious for as long as he or she has the virus and, until a cure is
found, this is perpetual; and the severity of the risk is catastrophic,
because the disease is, at this time, fatal. The dispute would lie in the
fourth factor: the court's decision would hinge on its assessment of the
probability or risk of transmission. The risk must be significant, as
determined by the reasonable medical judgments of public health
officials. 182
177. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
178. Id. at 287 n.16.
179. Id. at 288.
180. Id. (citations omitted); see also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422-23 (9th Cir.
1985) (applicant for employment is not "otherwise qualified" if there is "a reasonable probability
of substantial injury to the applicant or others").
181. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text; see also Chalk v. United States Dist.
Court, 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988) (referring to various articles and experts to the effect
that close, non-sexual contact does not lead to transmission).
182. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
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2. Methods of Transmission
The method of transmission of the disease is critical to a determination of whether HIV-positive inmates would pose a significant risk of
transmission. HIV is difficult to transmit and not transmitted by any
form of casual contact. Moreover, infection is highly unlikely based
on a single exposure involving a small dose of the virus. The primary
means of transmission are sexual intercourse, infusion or inoculation
of blood, and perinatal events.'" 3 HIV can be transmitted through
male-to-male homosexual contact and through heterosexual contact,
both male-to-female and female-to-male. The risk of transmission
increases as the number of potential exposures increases. Anal intercourse, especially for the receptive partner, and other4 practices that
8
may involve trauma or bleeding are especially risky.1
The second mode of transmission most commonly occurs through
the sharing of needles by intravenous drug users. This population is of
particular interest to correctional administrators because it is over-represented among inmates.18 5 There have also been cases of transmission through blood transfusions and hemophiliacs' receipt of blood
products. 8 6 The risk of HIV infection due to accidental needle-sticks
or puncture wounds is extremely small. Of 887 health-care workers
experiencing needle-sticks with needles known to have been previously
used on HIV-infected patients, only four of them became infected as a
result of these exposures.'8 7 The risk associated with open-wound and
mucous membrane exposures to HIV-contaminated blood is even
lower than the risk associated with needle-sticks. In three studies
totalling 88
435 health-care workers with such exposure, none became

infected.'
Finally, infected mothers may transmit HIV to the fetus in utero, to
the infant during labor and delivery, or to the infant shortly after birth
through infected breast milk. 8 9
There is absolutely no evidence that HIV can be spread by sneezing,
coughing, breathing, hugging, handshaking, sharing eating and drinking utensils, using the same toilet facilities, or any other form of nonsexual contact or activity. 9 0 Moreover, all evidence continues to
183. AIDS iN CoRREcnoNAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 8.

184. Id at 8-9
185. Id at 12.

186. Id
187. Id at 14.
188. Id
189. Id

190. Id at 15.
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point to the extreme unlikelihood of HIV transmission through other
body fluids such as may occur in biting or spitting incidents."'1
Although there may be a theoretical risk involved in deep kissing in
which saliva is exchanged, there have been no reports of infection
through such contact.1 92 Similarly, the possibility that HIV can be
transmitted by mosquitoes, head lice, or other insects is extremely
unlikely.193
3.

The Risk of Transmission in Non-Prison Contexts

Most courts that have addressed the issue of AIDS transmission in a
non-prison setting have found no significant risk of disease transmission. In Chalk v. United States District Court,9 4 the court found a
section 504 violation in the Orange County Department of Education's decision to bar the plaintiff from teaching in the classroom after
he developed AIDS. 95 In addressing the risk of transmission, the
court quoted the Surgeon General's Report on AIDS: "[t]ransmission
would necessitate exposure of open cuts to the blood or other bodily
fluids of the infected child, a highly unlikely occurrence. Even then,
routine safety procedures for handling blood or other body fluids...
would be effective in preventing transmission from children with
'
AIDS to other children in school." 196
The court noted that section
504 does not require complete scientific certainty about the extent of
the risk because the risk must be "significant" to justify the discrimination, and because " 'reasonable medical judgments of public health
officials' " are the controlling yardstick.' 97
Cases on the exclusion of students with HIV are in accord. In
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District,9 8 the court granted a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the school district from excluding a
child with AIDS from the classroom, despite the child's involvement
in a biting incident. The court found that "the AIDS virus is not
19 9
transmitted by human bites, even bites that break the skin."
191. Friedland & Klein, supra note 1, at 1132.
192. Id.

193. AIDS

IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES,

supra note 2, at 16.

194. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988),
195. Id. at 706.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 707-08.
198. 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
199. Id. at 380; see also Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1506 (1lth Cir. 1988) (remote
theoretical possibility of AIDS transmission does not justify exclusion of mentally handicapped
child with AIDS from regular mentally handicapped classroom); Doe v. Dolton Elementary
School Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (issuing a preliminary injunction
allowing a student with AIDS to return to school because the student would likely be found
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Similarly, a Second Circuit case ruled that segregating mentally
retarded hepatitis-B carriers from other mentally retarded school children was a violation of section 504 because integration posed no significant risk of transmission.2 'o This result was reached even though
there is reason to believe that hepatitis-B is transmitted much more
easily than AIDS.20 1 The court acknowledged that proof of drooling,
kissing, and mouthing of mutually used equipment by the retarded
children, along with evidence that the disease can be communicated by
such behavior, might have justified the segregation. 2 ' However, the
20 3
defendant offered no such evidence in court.

4. The Risk of Transmission to Other Inmates
The only court that has addressed the issue of whether the integra-

tion of HIV-positive inmates poses a significant risk of transmission is
Harrisv. Thigpen. 2 4 The court found the risk significant but offered
no discussion whatsoever on the issue.
Currently available data suggest low rates of transmission of the

virus within correctional facilities. The United States Army tested 542
inmates who had been incarcerated in a military prison for a period of
one to two years, and who had tested negative for the virus upon
intake. It found that none of them had become infected.20 5

In Maryland, voluntary follow-up testing of 393 inmates who had
been HIV-negative on intake one or two years earlier revealed that two
otherwise qualified to attend public school because there was no significant risk of transmission);
Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (court rejected argument that
"future theoretical harm" of transmission of the AIDS virus justified the exclusion); District 27
Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335-37 (Sup. Ct.
1986) (upholding the Board of Education's policy of determining on a case-by-case basis whether
the health and development of children with AIDS permitted them to attend school in an
unrestricted setting; finding that an injunction prohibiting the board from admitting any child
with AIDS into the classroom would violate section 504); cf Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 105
N.J. 587, 523 A.2d 655 (1987) (regulations allowing State Board of Education to exclude HWIinfected pupils only under very limited, individualized circumstances, with adequate provisions
for review of decision including the right to call witnesses and to cross-examination, are sufficient
to protect constitutional and statutory rights implicated); School Bd. v. Board of Educ,, 130
Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (exclusion of children with AIDS while not
excluding children with ARC or asymptomatic HIV-infection constitutes discrimination under
section 504; court did not address whether exclusion of all of the above would violate the Act).
200. New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir. 1979).
201. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
Friedland & Klein, supra note 1, at 1125.
202. New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children, 612 F.2d at 650.
203. Id.
204. 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1582-83 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
205. Kelley, Redfield, Ward, Burke, & Miller, Prevalence and Incidence of HTVL-III in a
Prison, 256 . A.M.A. 2198-99 (1986).
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(or .4% per year) were HIV-positive. This translates into a possible
sixty new infections per year in the entire Maryland inmate population. 20 6 A study in Nevada of 1,069 inmates, who were HIV-negative
on intake, showed that two had seroconverted by the time of release.
Because of the window period between infection and the appearance of
detectable antibodies, it was unclear whether those conversions
occurred as a result of exposure during incarceration. If both are
assumed to have occurred during incarceration, the study yields an
infection rate of .17% per year, which translates into eight new infections per year in the entire 1988 Nevada inmate population.20 7
Finally, testing by the Federal Bureau of Prisons showed that of
14,846 initially HIV-negative males, nine tested positive in follow-up
testing. However, all six of those nine who have been investigated
admitted to high-risk behavior prior to incarceration, so it is likely
that some of those individuals were in the window period at the time
of entry. 20 8
There are many arguments, however, against reliance on these statistics. The often lengthy incubation period of the disease (progression
from asymptomatic infection to end-stage AIDS usually takes two and
one-half to five years or more2 09) poses problems for epidemiologic
analysis. This is further complicated by the fact that an HIV-positive
individual may never develop symptoms although it is generally
believed that a majority of HIV-positive persons will develop ARC or
AIDS or both.210 Moreover, although on average detectable antibodies to the virus appear in the blood within six to twelve weeks after an
individual's infection with HIV,211 there have been reports of lag-times
of up to six months, and recent data suggest that even longer delays in
2 12
antibody appearance may not be unusual.
In addition, there are significant variations across jurisdictions in
the prevalence of infections and variations in the prevalence of highrisk behaviors in correctional facilities. 2 3 Both of these variables
affect transmission rates. Known outbreaks of syphilis and other sexually-transmitted diseases in prisons suggest that HIV can also be transmitted in the correctional setting. Moreover, many inmates have
206. 1988

UPDATE,

supra note 2, at 17.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 7.
210. Id. at 6.
211. Id. at 61.
212. Ranki, Krohn, Allain, Franchini, Valle, Antonen, Leuther & Krohn, Long Latency
Precedes Overt Seroconversion in Sexually Transmitted HIV Infection, 1987 LANCET 589-93.
213. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 31.
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histories of intravenous drug abuse. While it is unclear how much
drug abuse involving needle-sharing occurs in prison, it is probable
that at least some takes place. In addition, tattooing is prevalent in
may expose inmates to
many correctional facilities, and this activity
2 14

blood contaminated with the AIDS

virus.

The import of the lengthy incubation period, the possible lengthy
lag-time, and the potential modes of transmission must not be exaggerated. The ultimate proof of the threat of transmission is the actual
number of cases of transmission. As such, the above statistics present
the best available evidence. Furthermore, if these statistics are considered too few, a determination must await the additional statistics
which many jurisdictions are presently compiling. Until then, the risk
of transmission is simply not "significant" as required in Arline.2 15
Courts also address whether "routine safety procedures... would
be effective in preventing transmission."2'1 6 It is the responsibility of
prison authorities to ensure that inmates remain free from sexual
assault or other violence. Moreover, prison authorities are charged
with ensuring that prison rules and regulations are followed. One rule
is the prohibition on all drug use and sexual contact. Simply put,
HIV-positive inmates ought not to bear the brunt of the prison authorities' inability to perform their duties and other inmates' disobeyance
of prison rules and regulations.
5.

The Risk of Transmission to Prison Staff

There are no known cases of AIDS, ARC, or HIV positivity among
correctional staff as a result of contact with inmates. In Minnesota,
six correctional officers who claimed to have been potentially exposed
to infection in on-the-job incidents were tested. These incidents
included needle-sticks and fights in which blood was drawn. None of
them tested positive.2 17 Similarly, the Oklahoma correctional system
tested ten officers involved in potential transmission incidents, and
Oregon tested seven such officers. None were found to be HIV-positive. 2 18 Furthermore, there have not been any job-related cases of
infection among police officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, or any other public safety workers.2 19 Thus, the viability of this
214. Id.at 32.
215. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16, 288 (1987).
216. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting U.S.
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON A.I.D.S. 23-24 (1986).
217. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FAciLITms, supra note 2, at 22.
218. Id.
219. Id.; 1988 UPDATE, supra note 2, at 8.
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justification is negligible. Courts have consistently found that the
mere theoretical possibility of transmission, without further evidence,
does not suffice to establish a significant risk.22 °
D. The Reasonable Accommodation Requirement
The Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline held
that a "person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the work place will not be otherwise qualified
for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that
risk" 2"'2 If a court finds that the integration of HIV-positive inmates
poses a significant risk of transmission, the inmates can argue that reasonable accommodation would eliminate that risk.
A threshold issue is whether the reasonable accommodation
requirement applies to prisons. The United States Supreme Court, in
both Southeastern Community College v. Davis2 2 2 and School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline,22 3 looked to controlling regulations to determine that "reasonable accommodation" was required of the defendant.224 Unfortunately, other than the bare mention of federal
prisoners and the Department of Corrections, 22 5 no regulations specifically regulate correctional facilities. If the prison at issue, however,
receives federal financial assistance from a particular agency that has
promulgated regulations, such as the Department of Justice, those regulations can be consulted for the proposition that "reasonable accommodation" is required.
This is unnecessary, however, because a more recent Supreme Court
case stands for the general proposition that a reasonable accommodation requirement applies to all programs that receive federal money
220. See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1506 (1lth Cir. 1988); New York State Ass'n
of Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir. 1979).
221. 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987) (emphasis added). The reasonable accommodation
standard is not the equivalent of an affirmative action obligation. Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979). While some sections of the Rehabilitation Act
impose an affirmative action obligation, section 504 does not. Id. "Affirmative action" refers to
changes, adjustments, or modifications to existing programs that are substantial or constitute
fundamental alterations in the nature of the program. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300
n.20 (1985).
222. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
223. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
224. In Southeastern the Court looked to regulations covering the education context, 442 U.S.
at 408, while in Arline the Court consulted regulations governing employment of the
handicapped. 480 U.S. at 287 n.17. Arline interpreted these two cases to impose the same
requirement on recipients. Id.
225. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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whether or not controlling regulations impose such a requirement.
Such a requirement strikes:
a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs: while a grantee need not be
required to make "fundamental" or "substantial" modifications to
accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make "reasonable" ones.... [This] requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped
individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that
the grantee offers. The benefit itself, cannot be defined in a way that
effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals with
meaningful access to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful
access, reasonable accommodations... may have to be made.226
The Court offered this interpretation in the context of a challenge to a
provision of a state Medicaid program. No regulations appeared to
control.
Moreover, regulations promulgated under section 504 consistently
impose a "reasonable accommodation" requirement, which has come
to be interpreted as a requirement contained within the "otherwise
qualified" element.2 27 Accordingly, courts typically impose this
requirement on prisons without discussion. In Bonner v. Lewis, 228 the
court assumed that state prison officials were obligated to make reasonable accommodations to assure meaningful access to the program
at issue for the plaintiff inmate. 2 29 Likewise, in Harrisv. Thigpen,230
the court assumed, without discussion, that the reasonable accommodation requirement applied to prisons.
The reasonable accommodation requirement invokes a balancing
process. In Southeastern Community College, the Supreme Court
found that close, individual attention by a nursing instructor, needed
to ensure patient safety if the hearing impaired plaintiff took part in
the clinical phase of the program, was "a fundamental alteration in the
nature of the program" and therefore more substantial than that
required under section 504.231 Because allowing the plaintiff to take
only academic classes would not provide even a rough equivalent of
226. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300-01 (1985).
227. See ag., Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1988)
(inquiry into reasonable accommodation is one aspect of the "otherwise qualified" analysis under

section 504).
228.
229.
230.
231.

857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 561.
727 F. Supp. 1564, 1583 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
442 U.S. 397, 409-10 (1979).
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the training a nursing program normally gives, the college was not
2 32
required to accommodate the plaintiff.
A decision on whether "reasonable accommodation" would eliminate the risk of disease transmission, like a decision on whether integration poses a significant risk of transmission in the first place, would
focus on the facts. The court in Harrisfound that reasonable accommodation would not eliminate the significant risk of transmission if
HIV-positive inmates were integrated with the general prison population.23 3 The court reached this conclusion, however, without any discussion of feasible alternatives. The segregation of "aggressors" and
the education of the general prison population about the disease and
its transmission are alternatives that do not subject the HIV-positive
inmates to handicap discrimination. Indeed, in the area of consensual
sexual activity, there are indications that behavioral change is occurring in prisons, perhaps as a result of educational efforts. 234 As to
non-consensual and quasi-consensual sexual activity, transmission can
be prevented by more careful inmate classification, more intensive
supervision or surveillance, and more effective prosecution of inmate
rapists.
Moreover, arguably, an increase in prison staff and an elimination of
overcrowding, among other things, would reduce the risk. A determination of whether such accommodations impose "undue financial and
administrative burdens" on a prison, or require a "fundamental alteration in the nature" of the prison, would depend greatly on the facts
surrounding the particular prison at issue.
In sum, the argument that HIV-positive prisoners are "otherwise
qualified" under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is strong: they
probably do not pose any significant risk of disease transmission that
routine safety procedures or reasonable accommodation would not
eliminate. However, a decision on this issue depends greatly on the
level of scrutiny and amount of deference the court gives to the justifications that prison authorities offer.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There is much misinformation and fear surrounding the HIV virus.
The severity of the disease has fueled the dissemination of this misinformation and fear. Societal response has included calls to quarantine
even unincarceratedmembers of the population who carry the virus.
232. Id.
233. 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1583 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
234. AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 33.
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It is no surprise that this remedy has been visited upon one of the most
powerless groups in our society: the incarcerated.
There are good arguments that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
outlaws this response. Symptomatic HI-V-positive prisoners are
"handicapped" under the Act and asymptomatic carriers are being
treated as such. Furthermore, these prisoners are able to function adequately and safely in the general prison population, provided reasonable precautionary measures are taken, rendering them "otherwise
qualified" for integration.
The legality of the segregation of HIV-positive inmates under section 504 is hardly a settled question.23 5 In light of the evidence and
arguments discussed above, case-by-case decision-making, rather than
blanket segregation policies, more appropriately accommodates the
interest of inmates in freedom from handicap discrimination.

235. The only case that has decided the question did so without any analysis. Harris v.
Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1582-83 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
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APPENDIX A
HOUSING POLICIES FOR INMATES WITH AIDS, ARC,
AND ASYMPTOMATIC HIV INFECTION: STATE AND
FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEMS', OCTOBER 1988
Jursidictions Following this Policy for:

Policy

n

%

o All maintained in general

0

0%

population
o All maintained in general

1

2

Asymptomatic
HIV Infection

ARC

AIDS
n

%

n

8

16%

24

47%

9

18

12

24

population with
restrictions'
o All segregated/separatedc
o Case-by-case

_%

12
16

16
45

determination
o No policy

TOTAL

0
51

0
100%

3
51

2

6
101%

d

101%e

* These figures include hypothetical policies in jurisdictions that as yet have no cases in a
particular category.
'This category includes single-ceiling.
'This category includes hospitalization, infirmary housing, and administrative separation in
medical or non-medical units.
d In March 1989, Colorado discontinued mass screening and segregation of seropositives. This
change is not reflected in this table, which covers policies in force at the time of the October
1988 survey.
'Due to rounding.
Reprinted with permission from NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE ISSUES & PRACTICE, 1988
UPDATE: AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1989).
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APPENDIX B
HOUSING POLICIES FOR INMATES WITH AIDS, ARC,
AND ASYMPTOMATIC HIV INFECTION: CITY AND
COUNTY JAIL SYSTEMSa, OCTOBER 1988
Jursidictions Following this Policy for:
Asymptomatic
HIV Infection
AIDS
ARC
Polcy
* All maintained in general
population
" All maintained in general
population with
restrictionsb
* All segregated/separatedc
" Case-by-case
determination

" No policy
TOTAL

n

%

n

1

4%

4

2

7

2

46
43
0
100%

n

%

14%

15

54%

7

3

11

0

0

_%

21
50
7
d
99%

28

%d
10 1

* These

figures include hypothetical policies in jurisdictions that as yet have no cases in a
particular category.
bThis category includes single-celling.

'This category includes hospitalization, infirmary housing, and administrative separation in
medical or non-medical units.
'Due to rounding.
Reprinted with permission from
UPDATE:

AIDS

NATIONAL INSTTUTE OF JUSTICE ISSUES & PRACTICE,

iN CORRECTONAL FACILITIES

(1989).

1988

